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I INTRODUCTION 
P
ublic spending is a story of some people spending other people’s money. In
modern democracies, voters elect politicians to make decisions about
public spending for them, and they provide the funds by paying taxes. Two
aspects of this story are worrying and have received considerable academic
interest in recent years. The first is that public spending involves delegation,
and, hence, principal-agent relationships. Elected politicians can extract rents
from being in office, i.e., use some of the funds entrusted to them to pursue
their own interests, be it outright in corruption, for perks, or simply waste.
Voters might wish to eliminate the opportunity to extract rents by subjecting
politicians to rules stipulating what they can and must do under given
conditions. But the need to react to unforeseen developments and the
complexity of the situation makes the writing of such contracts impossible. For
the same reasons, politicians cannot realistically commit fully to promises
made during election campaigns. Hence, like principal-agent relations in
many other settings, the voter-politician relationship resembles an
“incomplete contract” (Seabright, 1996; Persson et al., 1997a, b; Tabellini,
2000).
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Conference of the Irish Economic Association. The second aspect is that most public spending today is targeted at
subgroups of citizens (taxpayers) in society. Targeted public policies, when
paid for from the general tax fund, involve redistribution of resources among
citizens; hence we refer to them as distributive policies. The important
implication of distributive policies is that those who benefit from a specific
public policy and those who pay for it are generally not the same. Instead,
those who benefit typically pay a small share of the total cost. As a result,
politicians representing the interests of individual groups in society tend to
overestimate the net social benefit from targeted public policies, as they
perceive the full social benefit from policies targeting their constituencies, but
only that part of the social cost that the latter bear through their taxes. This
is the “common pool” property of public budgeting (von Hagen and Harden,
1996).
Both the principal-agent relationship and the common pool of property
generate potential for excessive levels of spending, taxation, and public
borrowing. The more rampant the principal-agent problem, the greater will be
the divergence between voter preferences and the level and composition of
public spending. Comparisons of jurisdictions in which public finances are
determined by direct democracy with jurisdictions in which representative
democracy prevails show that, ceteris paribus, direct democracy leads to lower
levels of government expenditure and taxes, lower levels of government 
debt, an increase in local versus state spending, and a tendency to finance
government expenditure by charges rather than broad-based taxes
(Pommerehne, 1978; Matsusaka, 1995; Kirchgässner et al., 1999; Feld and
Kirchgässner, 1999). 
Similarly, the more severe the common pool problem, the greater will be the
divergence between the marginal social utility and the marginal social cost of
targeted public policies. Empirical studies show that this leads to excessive
levels of spending, deficits, and debt (von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and Harden,
1994a; Strauch, 1998; Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999). Other empirical studies
suggest that government spending and debt increase with the intensity of
ideological and ethnic divisions within a society (Roubini and Sachs, 1989;
Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina et al. 1997), or by ethnolinguistic and
religious fractionalisation (Annett, 2000). To the extent that such conflicts
make voters on either side of the divide neglect the tax burden falling on those
on the other side, they aggravate the common pool problem. 
Societies can create institutions that mitigate these problems. Three
institutional approaches are particularly relevant in this context.
• Imposing fiscal rules, i.e., ex ante controls such as balanced-budget con-
straints or referendum requirements for tax hikes that restrict the scope of
choices elected politicians can make regarding public finances; 
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and increasing the politicians’ incentives to deliver the policies voters most
prefer;
• Designing the decision-making processes over public finances that induce
policy makers to recognise more fully the marginal social benefits and costs
of their policies. 
In this paper, we review and discuss recent research into these three
approaches and their relative success in mitigating the principal agent and
common pool problems. In Section II, we discuss fiscal rules as instruments to
limit the principal agent problem and the common pool problem. In Section III,
we consider the role of electoral institutions in shaping and limiting the
principal agent problem. In Section IV, we look at the institutional aspects of
decision-making processes regarding public finances. In Section V, we
conclude with some remarks on institutional reform. 
II FISCAL RULES 
Most state governments in the US and provincial governments in Canada
are subject to balanced budget requirements or debt ceilings, and many state
constitutions in the US include numerical expenditure limits or require public
referenda for raising tax rates. History suggests that these controls were often
imposed by taxpayers, who were angry about the spending profligacy of their
elected representatives (Eichengreen and von Hagen, 1996; Millar 1997).
There is a fair amount of variation in the scope and strictness of these
constraints, documented by ACIR (1987) and Strauch (1998). Von Hagen and
Eichengreen (1996) and Stein et al. (1999) document fiscal rules imposed on
sub-national governments in other countries. Subjecting policy makers to such
ex ante controls seems the most straightforward approach to controlling their
behavior and they seem attractive for simplicity and transparency. 
But how successful are such constraints? Empirical evidence for US state
governments suggests that they do limit the size of the annual deficit in the
current budget and reduce the government debt ratio, if “full faith and credit”
debt is considered (Strauch 1998; Eichengreen 1990). But if other types of debt
instruments including the debt of off-budget entities are considered,
numerical constraints have no effect on public debt ratios (von Hagen, 1991).
This indicates that governments subject to stringent numerical deficit
constraints tend to substitute debt instruments not covered by the legal rule
for full faith and credit debt. Kiewiet and Szakalay (1996) find another
substitution effect, namely that state governments subject to more restrictive
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incurring larger debts than elsewhere. Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996)
find that countries where sub-national governments are subject to more
stringent statutory borrowing constraints tend to have higher central
government debt ratios. This is a third substitution effect. Strauch (1998)
shows that constitutional expenditure limits in the US induce a shift from the
(constrained) current budget to the (unconstrained) investment budget, but
they do not constrain total spending effectively. 
The key insight then is that the effectiveness of fiscal rules is limited at
best, because politicians are likely to find ways to circumvent them. This
conclusion matters for Europe and its monetary union, because the fiscal
framework of EMU relies heavily on the fiscal rules imposed on the member
governments by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. In
fact, the success of the deficit and debt limits under EMU has been quite
limited so far (Hughes-Hallett, Strauch and von Hagen, 2001). When these
limits were first imposed in 1992, the average debt ratio of the European
Union states stood at 60 per cent of GDP. In 1998, when euro-area member-
ship was decided, it was over 75 per cent. This increase was driven mainly by
the fiscal developments in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and the UK. It is
probably no coincidence that these are the largest countries among the 12
EMU states. In contrast, the debt ratios of the small states declined
significantly during the post-1992 period, indicating that the fiscal constraints
of EMU were more effective in these states. The experience suggests that the
role of external political pressures, such as admonitions brought by the
European Commission, are not strong enough to coerce internal politics in
large countries. Thus, if they are effective at all, the ex ante controls of EMU
may discipline fiscal policies in the small member states, but not in the larger
ones. Recent experience confirms this conjecture. The German government
was unwilling to accept a warning letter from the Commission, although such
a letter was warranted given its fiscal performance in 2001. Similarly, the
French and the Italian governments announced their intention to ignore
earlier commitments to balancing the budget by 2004 made in their Stability
Programmes. There are also increasing complaints about creative accounting
to circumvent the fiscal rules of EMU. 
III POLITICAL COMPETITION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Procedures for holding policy makers responsible for their actions are a key
element of the incomplete contract between voters and their elected
representatives (Persson et al. 1997a, b). The election process is the most
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makers personally accountable for past policies and create competition among
politicians. 
It is plausible to assume that politicians are opportunistic in the sense that
they care about their rents and wish to remain in office. If so, elections give
voters the opportunity to hold them accountable for past performance. This is
the main tenet of the retrospective-voting paradigm. Voters reappoint incum-
bents, if, based on the information available to them, they find their behaviour
satisfactory. Otherwise, they vote for alternative contestants competing for the
same office. Rents will be the more limited, the stronger is accountability and
the fiercer is competition. 
Electoral rules can be compared according to district magnitude, i.e., the
number of representatives in parliament elected from each electoral district.
At one extreme, exactly one representative is chosen from each district, i.e.,
the candidate with the largest number of votes in a district wins the seat in
parliament. This is the plurality rule. At the other extreme, an entire country
is just one large electoral district and candidates for all seats in parliament are
drawn from national party lists according to the share of votes cast for that list
in the entire country. This is the rule of proportional representation, which
prevails, e.g., in the Netherlands. Less extreme forms of proportional
representation divide a country into several large electoral districts, with
party lists presented for each of them.
Plurality rule focuses the election on the personal performance of the
individual candidates, thus maximising personal accountability. Proportional
representation, in contrast, weakens personal accountability, as voters can
assess only the average performance of all candidates elected from the party
list. However, plurality rule also gives voters the opportunity to reward
politicians for channelling general tax funds to the specific region where they
live. Under proportional representation, a similar opportunity to reward
politicians for channelling general tax funds to specific groups in society exists
only if political parties are organised social, ethnic, or other clear-cut cleavages
in society. In contrast, proportional representation reduces the politician’s
incentives for using distributive policies to secure his reelection if parties
encompass many social groups.
This reasoning has three public finance implications. 
• As personal accountability puts a check on the politician’s ability to extract
rents, we should expect less waste and smaller levels of public spending
under plurality rule than under proportional representation.
• As specific groups of voters reward politicians for distributive policies in
their own favour, plurality rule and proportional representation with many
small parties lead to a higher share of distributive policies rule than 
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(Tabellini, 2000). Thresholds requiring a minimum percentage of voters to
obtain any seats in parliament are important instruments to reduce the
number of parties and make them more encompassing. 
• Representatives from different districts or of different social groups are
likely to engage in logrolling and games of reciprocity to find majorities for
policies favouring their constituencies. Thus, plurality rule and propor-
tional representation with many small parties contribute positively to the
common pool problem. From this perspective, we should expect larger levels
of spending and larger deficits and debts in countries with plurality rule or
proportional representation with many small parties than in countries with
proportional representation and few, encompassing parties.
This leads us to the other aspect, competition. The need to gain a large
share of votes in a district under plurality rule is an important barrier to entry
for small parties. Political newcomers find it difficult to challenge incumbent
politicians, because they need a majority to succeed from the start. In contrast,
newcomers can win at least a small number of seats in parliament under
proportional representation. Political competition is, therefore, more intense
under the latter system, particularly when minimum vote thresholds are low.
If contestants use the election campaign to identify waste and point to
instances of rent-extraction, one can expect more intense competition to lead
to less waste and smaller rents. Thus, the consequences of weaker
accountability under proportional representation may be compensated by
more intense competition. 
Empirical Evidence
Empirical research in this area has only recently begun. It is difficult, as
electoral rules often do not neatly conform to the stylised characterisations
used above. For example, in some countries with proportional representation,
voters can influence the rank individual politicians have on the party list. This
strengthens personal accountability under this electoral system. Japan’s pre-
1994 system of proportional representation allocated multiple seats to each
district, which created a huge incentive for distributive policies as a seat could
be won with as little as 14.2 per cent of the votes. More detailed characterisa-
tions are necessary to capture the full details of electoral rules. 
Some interesting evidence exists nevertheless. Persson and Tabellini
(1999b) find that countries with plurality rule have smaller governments,
although this result is not statistically robust. Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi
(2000) find that proportional representation is associated with higher levels of
corruption than plurality rule. If corruption is a proxy for rents, this confirms
the theory. Persson and Tabellini (1999b) also show that plurality rule
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goods than proportional representation and parliamentary government.
Hallerberg (2000) studies the public finance impact of Italy’s electoral
reforms. In 1994, Italy replaced its system of proportional representation by
one that has three-quarters of all seats in parliament elected by plurality rule
and the remaining seats on the basis of proportional representation. The
reform was introduced with the hope that plurality rule would generate more
stable governments and a bi-polar party system. As it were, this did not
happen immediately. But when elections were called again in 1996, the
tendency towards a bi-polar system became stronger. Hallerberg argues that
this was an important step preparing Italy’s accession to EMU. 
Thus, the existing evidence, scant as it is, supports the view that electoral
rules have important consequences for public spending. The policy implication
is that rules strengthening accountability and competition are effective
controls of rents and distributive policies. 
IV LIMITING THE COMMON POOL PROBLEM: 
THE BUDGET PROCESS 
Public budgeting involves an externality – money from a general tax fund
is used to finance distributive policies. At the heart of the problem is a
misperception about the true budget constraint and true shadow relative
prices of public policy programmes. Individual politicians assume that an
increase in spending on targeted policies will provide their constituencies with
more of the public services they desire at only a fraction of the total cost, since
the rest is paid by other taxpayers. The less weight they give to the tax burden
of people outside their constituencies in their decisions, the greater the
tendency to ask for more public services than they would, if each benefiting
group were charged the full cost of the services delivered to it. The larger the
number of politicians drawing on the same general tax fund, the lower seems
marginal cost of distributive policies for each of them and the greater is the
overspending bias. Putting this argument into a dynamic context, where
money can be borrowed to finance current spending, one can show that the
common pool problem leads to excessive deficits and government debts in
addition to excessive spending levels (Velasco 1999; von Hagen and Harden,
1996).
The analogy with a common pool problem suggests that the excess spending
and deficit biases can be reduced by making politicians more aware of the true
budget constraint. This is the main role of the budget process in our context.
The budget process consists of the formal and informal rules governing
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government. It includes the rules relating to the formulation of a budget by the
executive, to its passage through the legislature, and to its implementation by
the executive. The budget process distributes strategic influence and creates
or destroys opportunities for collusion. Appropriately designed, it can induce
policy makers to take a comprehensive view of the costs and benefits of all
public policies financed through the budget. Inappropriate design fails to do
that and encourages politicians to care only about the rents and distributive
policies they can attract for themselves. Where that is the case, we call a
budget process fragmented. The opposite of fragmentation is centralisation of
the budget process. 
The budget process can serve its purpose effectively only if all conflicts
between competing claims on public finances are indeed resolved within its
scope. Four deviations from this principle undermine its functioning. 
• The use of off-budget funds, which allow policy makers to circumvent the
constraints of the budget process and remove decisions altogether from
being challenged by conflicting distributional interests. 
• “Non-decisions,” which occur when expenditures included in the budget are
determined by developments exogenous to the budget process. Prime
examples are the indexation of spending programmes and “open-ended”
spending appropriations, e.g., welfare payments based on entitlements
whose parameters are fixed by simple law.1 They allow policy makers to
avoid “tough” decisions (Weaver, 1986), but they degrade the budget process
to a mere forecast of exogenous developments.
• “Mandatory spending laws”, i.e., non-financial laws that make certain
government expenditures compulsory and the budget a mere summary of
spending mandates created by simple legislation. An effective budget
process requires a clear distinction between non-financial laws (which
create the authorisation for certain government undertakings) and the
budget, which makes specific funds available for a specific time period. 
• Contingent liabilities such as guarantees for liabilities of public or non-
public entities. While one must recognise that contingent liabilities cannot
be fully avoided and that a proper accounting of them is a difficult task,
their existence and importance for the government’s financial stance can be
brought to the attention of decision makers in the budget process by
requiring the government to submit a report on the financial guarantees it
has entered into as part of the budget documentation.
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1 Setting the relevant parameters of entitlement programmes is part of the annual budget process
in several countries. Another approach, used in Denmark, is to set cash limits on welfare
appropriations and require the relevant minister to propose spending adjustments and changes in
the relevant non-financial laws if these limits are overrun (von Hagen and Harden 1994a). Institutional Elements of Centralisation
Budget processes can be approximately divided into four stages, each
involving different actors with different roles. The “executive planning stage”
usually begins about a year before the relevant fiscal year and ends with the
submission of a draft budget to the legislature. It involves the setting of budget
guidelines, bids for budget appropriations from the various spending
departments, the resolution of conflicts between the spending interests in the
executive, and the drafting of the revenue budget. The “legislative approval
stage” includes the process of parliamentary amendments to the budget
proposal, which may involve more than one house of parliament. This stage
ends with the passing of the budget law. The “executive implementation stage”
covers the fiscal year to which the budget law applies. During this stage,
deviations from the budget law can occur, either formally by adoption of
supplementary budget laws in parliament, or informally by shifting funds
between chapters of the budget law and by overrunning the spending limits
provided by the law. The “ex post accountability stage” involves a review of the
final budget documents by a court of auditors or a similar institution checking
the consistency of the actual spending and revenues with the legal
authorisation. 
Institutional elements of centralisation primarily concern the first three
stages, with different elements applying to different stages.2 At the executive
planning stage, the purpose is to promote agreement on spending and deficit
targets derived from a comprehensive view of the budget. Maximum
fragmentation prevails, when the budget is degraded to a mere collection of
uncoordinated bids from the individual spending agencies. Elements of
centralisation promote the consistent setting of targets at the outset of the
process and assure that they constrain subsequent decisions effectively. A key
issue is the process of conflict resolution among the members of the executive.
Uncoordinated and ad hoc conflict resolution involving many actors simultan-
eously promotes log-rolling and reciprocity and, hence, fragmentation. Cabinet
decision-making based on the principle of unanimity, as in Japan, has a
similar effect. Fragmentation can be limited by the introduction of senior
cabinet committees with the authority to decide in cases of budgetary conflicts. 
At the legislative approval stage, elements of centralisation control the debate
and voting procedures in parliament. Because of the much larger number of
decision makers involved, the common pool problem is even larger in the
legislature than in the executive. Fragmentation is rampant, when parliament
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2 At the last stage of the process, the legality of the budget is checked by the appropriate
accounting body. Obviously, the design of the budget process becomes ineffective, if policy makers
operate outside the law. Thus, the last stage provides an important, necessary condition for the
effectiveness of institutional design.can make unlimited amendments to the executive’s budget proposal, when
spending decisions are made in legislative committees with narrow and
dispersed authorities (“Balkanisation of Committees,” see Crain and Miller,
1990), and when there is little guidance of the parliamentary process either by
the executive or by the speaker. Elements of centralisation protect the
executive’s or, in presidential systems, the budget committee’s position as an
agenda setter in the legislature. 
At the implementation stage, elements of centralisation assure that the
budget law effectively constrains the spending decisions of the executive. The
weaker the constraints the budget law creates for actual spending decisions
during the year, the more fragmented is the budget process. The finance
minister’s ability to monitor and control spending flows during the fiscal year
is critical at this stage. Another important element is the rule concerning
changes of the budget law during the year. The easier it is to change the
budget law or to replace it by a new one, the less effective is the budget process
in constraining financial decisions of the government and solving the common
pool problem. The frequent use of supplementary budgets during the fiscal
year is a strong indicator of fragmentation at this stage.
Transparency of the budget and the budget process is an important design
element on all three stages. Lack of transparency creates opportunities for
collusion among policy makers pursuing their own interests. It prevents
decision makers in the budget process from developing a comprehensive view
of the full spending and revenue consequences of their decisions. Transparency
requires that the budget documents are comprehensive and that expenditures
are clearly attributed to the relevant spending making units within the
government. It is promoted by clear accounting rules including for tax
expenditures and contingent liabilities such as guarantees. While it is
sometimes argued that intransparency strengthens the role of the finance
minister as a guardian of fiscal discipline (e.g. Milesi-Ferretti, 2000), lack of
transparency of the budget and the budget process prevails more regularly in
practice, when the finance minister is weak and the process very fragmented.
While the lack of transparency may be useful for a ministry in such
circumstances, this is clearly not a desirable design.3
Reviewing elements of centralisation in Europe, the US, Latin America and
Asia reveals that centralisation follows two basic approaches. The first is
centralisation based on “delegation” or vesting individual actors with special
strategic powers. The second is centralisation based on “contracts” or binding
agreements among all participants negotiated at the outset of the budget
process. 
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3 A prime example of this is the budget process in Japan, see Ichi (2000).Delegation
With delegation, the budget process lends special authority to a “fiscal
entrepreneur” with the authority to set the broad parameters of the budget
and to assure that all other participants observe them. An effective
“entrepreneur” has the ability to monitor the other participants and to use
selective punishments against any defectors. Among the cabinet members, the
“entrepreneur” is typically the finance minister. Since the finance minister is
not bound by individual spending interests as much as the spending ministers,
and since the finance minister typically is charged with drafting the revenue
budget, it is plausible to assume that the finance minister takes the most
comprehensive view of the budget among the members of the executive. 
In practice, delegation can take a variety of forms. In the French model, the
finance minister, backed by the prime minister, has strong agenda-setting
powers over the other cabinet members. The British budget process evolves as
a series of bilateral negotiations between the spending departments and the
finance minister, in which the latter has strong bargaining power based on
superior information, seniority, and political back-up from the prime minister.
The German model of delegation gives the finance minister veto power for all
budgetary decisions in cabinet meetings. 
Under the delegation approach, setting budget targets and drafting the
budget proposal is mainly the responsibility of the finance ministry, which
monitors the individual bids, negotiates directly with the spending
departments and approves the bids submitted to the final cabinet meeting.
Unresolved conflicts between individual spending and the finance ministers
are typically arbitrated by the prime minister.
At the legislative stage, the delegation approach lends large agenda-setting
powers to the executive over parliament. One important instrument here is to
limit the scope of amendments parliamentarians can make to the executive’s
budget proposal. In France, for example, amendments cannot be received
unless they reduce expenditures or create a new source of public revenues. A
second element concerns the voting procedure. The French government, for
example, can force the legislature to vote on large parts of or the entire budget
in a block vote, with only those amendments considered that the executive is
willing to accept. In the UK, the executive can make the vote on the budget a
vote of confidence, thus raising the stakes for a rejection considerably. The
position of the executive can also be strengthened by giving the finance
minister veto power over the budget passed by the legislature, as in Germany
and Spain.
Afinal element concerns the budgetary authority of the upper house. Where
both houses have equal budgetary authority, as in Italy or Belgium, finding a
compromise between the two houses is a necessary part of the budget process.
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bodies. To strengthen the executive, the budgetary authority of the upper
house may be limited as in France and Germany, where the lower house
prevails if an agreement between the two chambers cannot be reached. In the
UK, the upper house has no budgetary authority at all, leaving the executive
with only one chamber to deal with in the budget process. 
At the implementation stage, finally, centralisation requires that the
finance minister be able to monitor and control the flow of expenditures during
the year. This may take the form of requiring that the spending departments
obtain the finance minister’s authorisation to disburse funds during the year.
The finance minister’s authority to impose cash limits during the year is
another control mechanism. Effective monitoring and control is also important
to prevent spending departments from behaving strategically, i.e., from
spending their appropriations early in the year and demanding additional
funds later with the threat of closing down important public services
otherwise.
Furthermore, centralisation requires tight limits on any changes in the
original budget law through the modification of appropriations once the fiscal
year has begun. One element here is the requirement that transfers of funds
between different chapters of the budget be authorised by the finance minister
or parliament. The same applies to transfers of funds between different fiscal
years. Although carry-over provisions have obvious efficiency gains, their use
should be limited and strictly monitored to assure that the finance minister
can keep track of a spending department’s financial position. Another point is
to restrict the use of supplementary budgets. Where supplementary budgets
during the fiscal year become the norm, as in Italy and Belgium in the 1980s
and Germany in the 1990s, one cannot expect that policy makers will take the
constraints embedded in the original budget law serious.
Contracts
Under the contract approach, the budget process starts with an agreement
on a set of binding fiscal targets negotiated among the members of the
executive. Emphasis here is on the bargaining process as a mechanism to
reveal the externalities involved in budget decisions and on the binding nature
of the targets. Aprime example for this approach is the Danish budget process,
which, since 1982, starts with negotiations among the cabinet members fixing
spending limits for each spending department. Often, these spending limits
are derived from medium-term fiscal programmes or the coalition agreement
among the ruling parties. Irish coalition agreements since 1989 included
medium-term fiscal strategies to reduce the public debt, which provided the
background to the annual negotiations over budget targets.
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consistency of the individual departments’ spending plans within these limits.
As in the Netherlands, for example, the finance minister usually has an
information advantage over the spending ministers in the budget
negotiations, but no extra strategic powers. Conflict resolution involves senior
cabinet committees and often the leaders of the coalition parties in the
legislature. 
At the legislative stage, the contract approach places less weight on the
executive’s role as an agenda setter and more weight on the role of the
legislature monitoring the faithful implementation of the fiscal targets.
Institutionally, this means that the contract approach relies less on controlling
parliamentary amendments and more on the legislature’s ability to monitor
the fiscal performance of the executive. One important element of this is the
legislature’s right to request information from the executive. It can be
improved by setting up committees whose authorities reflect the authorities of
the spending departments, and by giving committees a formal right to request
information from the executive and to call witnesses from the executive to
testify before committees. The Danish parliament, for example, has all three
of these rights, while the German parliament has only the first and the British
parliament has neither one. 
At the implementation stage, the contract approach resembles the
delegation approach in emphasising the monitoring and control powers of the
finance minister. 
Institutional Choice
The delegation approach relies on hierarchical structures within the
executive, and between the executive and the legislature. In contrast, the
contract approach builds on a more even distribution of authorities in
government. In democratic settings, hierarchical structures typically prevail
within political parties, while relations between parties are more even. This
suggests that the institutional choice between the two approaches depends
critically on the number of parties in government. More specifically,
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998) suggest that delegation is appropriate for
single-party governments, while the contracts approach is appropriate for
multi-party coalition governments There are two reasons behind this
conjecture. 
First, a spending minister in a one-party government can be reasonably
sure that the finance minister shares his basic spending preferences;
disagreement with the finance minister will be mainly as a result of the
common pool problem. In a coalition government, in contrast, cabinet
members are likely to have more diverging views regarding spending
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minister, who necessarily comes from one of the coalition parties, would create
a principal agent problem for a coalition government, that does not arise in a
single-party government. That is, a strong finance minister might abuse his
powers and unduly promote the political interests of his own party at the cost
of others. This problem does not arise under the contract approach, as the
fiscal targets are negotiated among all cabinet members.
Second, delegation and contracts use different enforcement mechanisms. In
one-party governments, the ultimate punishment for a defecting spending
minister is his dismissal from office. Such punishment is heavy for the
individual, but generally light for the government as a whole. It can be used,
if the prime minister is sufficiently strong and has the authority to select and
replace cabinet members.4 In coalition governments, in contrast, individual
defecting ministers cannot be punished easily. Since the distribution of
portfolios is typically given by the coalition agreement, the prime minister
cannot easily dismiss intransigent ministers from parties other than his own. 
Breaking up the coalition is the ultimate punishment in coalition
governments. This punishment is heavy for the entire coalition. The point is
illustrated by the fact that fiscal targets are often part of the coalition
agreement. The credibility of this enforcement mechanism hinges on two
conditions. One is the existence of alternative coalition partners in parlia-
ment. The other is the expected response of the voters, as a coalition may be
broken up with the anticipation of new elections. 
These different enforcement mechanisms also explain the different
relations between the executive and the legislature in the legislative phase of
the budget process. When a single ruling party enjoys a majority in
parliament, the main concern of the legislative stage is to limit the scope of
defections from the budget proposals by individual members of parliament.
With multi-party coalitions, in contrast, defections from the budget targets,
especially if they are backed up by the coalition agreement, are a weaker
concern. However, each party involved in the coalition will want to watch
carefully that the executive sticks to the coalition agreement. The delegation
approach, therefore, typically makes the executive a much stronger agenda
setter in parliament than the contract approach, while the contract approach
lends more monitoring powers to the legislature than the former. 
Finally, commitment to fiscal targets is per se much less credible for one-
party governments. Consider a single-party government with a weak prime
minister and a weak finance minister that has announced a set of fiscal
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4 The Japanese example shows that this is not necessarily the case even in one-party settings.targets at the outset of the budget process and assume that some spending
ministers renege on the targets later on. Other cabinet members cannot
credibly threaten the defectors with dissolving the government, since they
would punish themselves. A credible threat is absent, the entire cabinet will
just walk away from the targets.5
The number of parties in government strongly depends on electoral
institutions. Intuitively, the chance that one party wins a majority in
parliament is the larger, the fewer parties there are. In two-party systems, the
emergence of an absolute majority is a virtual certainty. Empirical studies
show that plurality rule promotes the emergence of two-party systems and
one-party majority governments (Duverger 1954; Taagepera and Shugart,
1989, 1993). In contrast, proportional representation allows for more variation
in district magnitude, but is consistently characterised by multi-party
coalition governments (Lijphart, 1984, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989,
1993), especially if minimum-vote thresholds are low. These patterns suggest
that countries seeking to centralise their budgetary processes are more likely
to opt for the contract approach, if their elections are based on proportional
representation (and low thresholds), while they are more likely to opt for
delegation, if their elections are based on plurality rule. Hallerberg and von
Hagen (1998) and Hallerberg et al. (2001) test and confirm this hypothesis for
the European Union states.
This has important implications for the fiscal framework of EMU. The
Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact strongly
resemble the contract approach to centralising budget processes. If so, one
should expect that these procedures are more effective in countries whose
institutional environment is favorable for this approach, and less effective in
environments where the delegation approach is appropriate. Empirical
evidence provided by Hughes-Hallett et al. (2001) confirms exactly that.
Between 1992 and 1996, debt ratios increased significantly in the European
states with fragmented processes and those relying on delegation, but very
little in states applying a contract approach. After 1996, states applying a
contract approach achieved much larger reductions in their debt ratios than
the others. Hallerberg et al. (2001) show that many states applying a contract
approach implemented new mechanisms at the national level strengthening
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5 This conclusion is qualified by the observation, made above, that the effectiveness of the contract
approach depends on the availability of alternative coalition partners. German governments of the
past 30 years were coalitions between a large and a small party with no alternative partner
available for either one. Germany’s budget process, which was built on delegation, therefore fits
this environment. When the German government was formed by the two large parties CDU and
SPD in the late 1960s, elements of a contract approach were introduced to secure a high degree of
fiscal discipline.their ability to reach their fiscal targets despite unexpected economic
developments. States relying on delegation did nothing or little to achieve
that. This suggests that the Stability Programmes and the Stability and
Growth Pact will work more effectively in states where the domestic budget
process is characterised by a significant degree of centralisation under the
contract approach. They will be much less effective in assuring fiscal discipline
in states, where centralisation of the budget process relies on delegation, and
in states with rather fragmented budget processes.6
Empirical Evidence
A fast-growing literature starting with von Hagen (1992) has presented
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that centralisation of the budget
process leads to smaller government deficits and debts. Von Hagen (1992)
provided evidence from 12 European Union countries showing a significant
negative association between the centralisation of the budget process and
general government deficits and debts relative to GDP. Von Hagen and Harden
(1994b) extend and broaden the analysis and confirm the hypothesis that
centralisation of the budget process is associated with smaller deficits and
debts. De Haan and Sturm (1994) again work with European Union data and
show that the hypothesis holds up empirically even when a number of political
factors such as the composition and stability of governments is controlled for.
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998, 1999) use panel data analysis for 15 EU
countries and show that centralisation of the budget process goes along with
smaller annual budget deficits even when controlling for a number of economic
determinants of the budget deficit and other political variables. 
Gleich (2002) presents a study of the budget processes in ten Central and
East European countries, all candidates for accession to the EU. He
documents a considerable degree of variation in the design of these processes
across the ten countries. This is interesting, since a budget process in the
proper sense did not exist under the former, socialist regime. All ten countries
hold elections under various forms of proportional representation. Gleich
shows that centralisation conforms to the contract approach in these countries
and that there is a strong negative association between the degree of
centralisation of the budget process and the public sector deficits and debts
that emerged in the second half of the 1990s.
Turning to geographical areas outside Europe, Alesina et al. (1995) and
Stein et al. (1999) use panel data analysis from Latin American countries to
show that centralisation of the budget process goes along with lower govern-
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6 This proposition is confirmed by the fact that neither France nor Germany bothered much to
announce their plans for tax reforms in the context of their stability programmes in 2000.ment deficits. Jones et al. (1999) analyse a panel of Argentine provinces and
confirm the same hypothesis. Lao-Araya (1997) provides similar results for
eleven Asian countries. Strauch (1998) uses data from the 50 US state
governments to show that centralisation significantly reduces annual budget
deficits. Taking a different methodological approach, the country studies of
Stienlet (2000), Molander (2000) and Strauch and von Hagen (1999) point to
the importance of centralisation in achieving (or, in the case of Germany
losing) fiscal discipline. 
Finally, Strauch (1998) and Gleich (2002) show that centralisation of the
budget process is also associated with smaller levels of government spending,
as the common pool argument suggests. 
To  summarise, the hypothesis that centralisation of the budget process
leads to lower government deficits and debts can be considered as empirically
well established today. It has been confirmed in very different geographical
and political settings. Thus, one can conclude that centralisation of the budget
process is an important and effective way to mitigate the common pool
problem of public budgeting.
Centralisation and Flexibility of Budgetary Policies
Because centralisation emphasises strict adherence to fiscal targets, one
might suspect that it implies rigidity of budgetary policies and reduces the
scope for reaction to unforeseen events. If so, there could be a trade-off
between achieving a higher degree of fiscal discipline and achieving a
desirable degree of macroeconomic stabilisation.
However, flexibility to react to unforeseen events can be achieved at the
implementation stage of the budget process in a number of different ways
without working against centralisation, such as the possibility to charge
expenditures against future budgets or to transfer unused appropriations to
the next year or the creation of a “rainy day fund,” i.e., an unspecified
appropriation that can be used for emergencies. Hallerberg et al. (2001) show
that many of the EU states that have adopted a contract approach to
centralisation implemented rules enabling them to deal more effectively with
unexpected revenue or spending developments in recent years. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) estimate the cyclical elasticity of
government deficits in the 15 European Union states. Based on panel data,
they find that centralisation per se does not change the cyclical elasticity. In
fact, countries with strong finance ministers are characterised by a relatively
larger cyclical elasticity. This suggests that a strong finance minister can react
more quickly to economic downturns and upswings. Importantly, there is no
indication of a trade-off between macroeconomic stabilisation and mitigating
excessive spending in the design of a budget process. 
FISCAL RULES, FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL PERFORMANCE 279VI NSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Fiscal institutions have important consequences for the spending
performance of governments, both in terms of the level of spending, the
composition of spending, and the levels of deficits and debts. This suggests
that appropriate institutional design can help mitigate problems of waste,
divergences between public preferences and what the public sector delivers,
and fiscal profligacy.
This claim rests on the basic conjecture that institutions frame the
decisions made within them, i.e., that a given group of individuals facing a
given problem makes predictably different decisions under different
institutional arrangements. The obvious objection is, that policy makers would
rid themselves of the institutions and ignore or change the rules if they feel
constrained by them. After all, institutions are man-made and subject to
change. Without a satisfactory answer to this objection, the power of
institutions and the promises of institutional reform must remain in doubt.
Such an answer has three points. First, the individuals involved in
decisions over public finances do not always have the authority themselves to
change the rules. Second, even if policy makers feel constrained by existing
institutions, they will want to change these institutions, only if they can be
reasonably sure to achieve more desirable outcomes under the alternative. But
this is far from trivial. Complex decisions made by groups are prone to
instability and irrationality. Therefore, the absence of institutional rules is
often much less desirable than the presence of rules, even if their constraints
are being felt. Third, institutional rules in the budget context give individual
policy makers assurance that excessive budget demands by others will not be
successful, and thus make it easier for them to restrain their own demands. 
Nevertheless, one should not interpret the theory and evidence outlined
above as saying that a change in the letter of the law is an effective means to
reduce rents, excessive spending, and deficits. Precisely because changing
institutions takes some extraordinary effort, policy makers are unlikely to do
that unless they are aware of an acute fiscal problem. But if that is the case,
how can we prove that the institutional change contributed to the fiscal
correction, if the latter was what policy makers wanted anyway?
A first point is that institutional changes are very visible to the public and
the markets and, therefore provide an important signalling function.
Governments showing the resolve for a more disciplined fiscal policy by
reforming pertinent institutions will find it easier to convince the public and
financial markets of their good intentions. To the extent that this reduces
opposition against fiscal reforms and cutbacks, the necessary policy changes
are made easier.
280 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWA second point is that the awareness of a fiscal problem may not be
permanent. As other problems arise and the deficit returns to normal levels,
the attention to the problems of waste, excessive spending and deficits is
reduced and the tendency for overspending and excessive deficits rises again.
At that point, having better institutions in place than before can be an
important mechanism to preserve the collective memory of the previous
difficulties. 
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